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Abstract
We use the self-tuning Experience Weighted Attraction model with repeated-game strategies as
a computer testbed to examine the relative frequency, speed of convergence and progression of a
set of repeated-game strategies in four symmetric 2 × 2 games: Prisoner’s Dilemma, Battle of the
Sexes, Stag-Hunt, and Chicken. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, we find that the strategy with
the most occurrences is the “Grim-Trigger.” In the Battle of the Sexes game, a cooperative pair
that alternates between the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria emerges as the one with the most
occurrences. In the Stag-Hunt and Chicken games, the “Win-Stay, Lose-Shift” and “Grim-Trigger”
strategies are the ones with the most occurrences. Overall, the pairs that converged quickly ended up
at the cooperative outcomes, whereas the ones that were extremely slow to reach convergence ended
up at non-cooperative outcomes.
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1 Introduction
Robert Axelrod pioneered the area of computational simulations with the tournaments in which
game-playing algorithms were submitted to determine the best strategy in the repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game (Axelrod (1984)). Axelrod and Dion (1988) went on to model the evolutionary
process of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a genetic algorithm (Holland (1975). The
genetic algorithm is an adaptive learning routine that combines survival of the fittest with a
structured information exchange that emulates some of the innovative flair of human search. Other
adaptive learning paradigms are derivatives of either belief-based models or reinforcement-based
models. Belief-based models operate on the premise that players keep track of the history of play
and form beliefs about other players’ behavior based on past observation. Players then choose a
strategy that maximizes the expected payoff given the beliefs they formed. Reinforcement-based
models operate according to the “law of effect,” which was formulated in the doctoral dissertation
of Thorndike (1898). In principle, reinforcement learning assumes that a strategy is “reinforced” by
the payoff it earned and that the propensity to choose a strategy depends, in some way, on its stock
of reinforcement. On the other hand, Camerer and Ho (1999) introduced in their seminal study
a truly hybridized workhorse of adaptive learning, the Experience Weighted Attraction (EWA)
model. Despite its originality in combining elements from both belief-based and reinforcement-
based models, EWA was criticized for carrying ‘too’ many free parameters. Responding to the
criticism, Ho, Camerer, and Chong (2007) replaced some of the free parameters with functions that
self-tune, while other parameters were fixed at plausible values. Appropriately labeled, the self-
tuning EWA, the model does exceptionally well in predicting subjects’ behavior in a multitude
of games, yet has been noticeably constrained by its inability to accommodate repeated-game
strategies. As Camerer and Ho (1999) acknowledge in their conclusion, the model will have to be
upgraded to cope with repeated-game strategies “because stage-game strategies (actions) are not
always the most natural candidates for the strategies that players learn about” (p. 871).1
In Ioannou and Romero (2014), we propose a methodology that is generalizable to a broad class
of repeated games to facilitate operability of adaptive learning models with repeated-game strate-
gies. The methodology consists of (1) a generalized repeated-game strategy space, (2) a mapping
between histories and repeated-game beliefs, and (3) asynchronous updating of repeated-game
strategies. The first step in operationalizing the proposed methodology is to use generalizable
rules, which require a relatively small repeated-game strategy set but may implicitly encompass a
much larger space (see, for instance, Stahl’s rule learning in Stahl (1996), Stahl (1999) and Stahl
and Haruvy (2012)). The second step applies a fitness function to establish a mapping between
histories and repeated-game beliefs. Our approach solves the inference problem of going from his-
1A first attempt was undertaken in the study of Chong, Camerer, and Ho (2006), albeit the model proposed
was specific to the structure of Trust and Entry games.
1
tories to beliefs about opponents’ strategies in a manner consistent with belief learning.2 The third
step accommodates asynchronous updating of repeated-game strategies. The methodology is im-
plemented by building on three proven action-learning models: a self-tuning Experience Weighted
Attraction model (Ho, Camerer, and Chong (2007)), a γ-Weighted Beliefs model (Cheung and
Friedman (1997)), and an Inertia, Sampling and Weighting model (Erev, Ert, and Roth (2010)).
The models’ predictions with repeated-game strategies are validated with data from experiments
with human subjects in four symmetric 2 × 2 games: Prisoner’s Dilemma, Battle of the Sexes,
Stag-Hunt, and Chicken. The goodness-of-fit results indicate that the models with repeated-game
strategies approximate subjects’ behavior substantially better than their respective models with
action learning. The model with repeated-game strategies that performs the best is the self-tuning
EWA model, which captures significantly well the prevalent outcomes in the experimental data
across the four games.
In this study, our goal is to use the self-tuning EWA model with repeated game strategies as
a computer testbed to examine the relative frequency, speed of convergence and progression of a
set of repeated-game strategies in the four aforementioned symmetric 2× 2 games. Learning with
repeated-game strategies is important on many levels (henceforth, for brevity, we refer to repeated-
game strategies as strategies, unless there is a risk of confusion). First, identifying empirically
relevant strategies can help future theoretical work to identify refinements or conditions that lead
to these strategies. The literature on repeated games has made little progress towards this target
thus far. Second, pursuing an understanding of the strategies that emerge may also help identify
in which environments cooperation is more likely to be sustained. Third, identifying the set of
strategies used to support cooperation can provide a tighter test of the theory. For instance, we
could test whether the strategies that emerge coincide with the ones that the theory predicts.
Similar to Ioannou and Romero (2014), in the computational simulations, we chose to limit
the number of potential strategies considered so as to reflect elements of bounded rationality and
complexity as envisioned by Simon (1947). Thus, the players’ strategies are implemented by a
type of finite automaton called a Moore machine (Moore (1956)). According to the thought
experiment, a fixed pair of players is to play an infinitely-repeated game with perfect monitor-
ing and complete information. A player is required to choose a strategy out of a candidate set
consisting of one-state and two-state automata. The strategy choice is based on the attraction of
the strategy. Initially, each of the strategies in a player’s candidate set has an equal attraction
2Alternatively, Hanaki, Sethi, Erev, and Peterhansl (2005) develop a model of learning of repeated-game strate-
gies with standard reinforcement. Reinforcement learning responds only to payoffs obtained by strategies chosen
by the player and, thus, evades the inference problem highlighted above. Yet reinforcement models are most sen-
sible when players do not know the foregone payoffs of unchosen strategies. Several studies show that providing
foregone payoff information affects learning, which suggests that players do not simply reinforce chosen strategies
(see Mookherjee and Sopher (1994), Rapoport and Erev (1998), Camerer and Ho (1999), Costa-Gomes, Crawford,
and Broseta (2001), Nyarko and Schotter (2002) and Van Huyck, Battalio, and Rankin (2007)).
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and hence an equal probability of being selected. The attractions are updated periodically as the
payoffs resulting from strategy choices are observed. The new strategy is chosen on the basis of
the updated attractions. Over the course of this process, some strategies decline in use, while
others are used with greater frequency. The process continues until convergence to a limiting
distribution is approximated.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, we find that the strategy with the most occurrences was the
“Grim-Trigger.” Moreover, the pairs that converged quickly ended up at the cooperative outcome,
whereas the ones that were extremely slow to reach convergence ended up at the defecting outcome.
In the Battle of the Sexes game, a cooperative pair that alternates between the two pure-strategy
Nash equilibria emerged as the one with the most occurrences. The pairs that alternated were
quicker to reach convergence compared to the ones that ended up at one of the two pure-strategy
Nash equilibria. In the Stag-Hunt and Chicken games, the “Win-Stay, Lose-Shift” and “Grim-
Trigger” strategies were the ones with the most occurrences. Similar to the other games, the
automaton pairs that converged quickly ended up at the cooperative outcomes (i.e. the payoff-
dominant equilibrium in the Stag-Hunt game, and the conciliation outcome in the Chicken game),
whereas the ones that were slow to reach convergence ended up at non-cooperative outcomes.
2 The Self-Tuning EWA with Repeated-Game Strategies
2.1 Preliminaries
To simplify exposition, we start with some notation. The stage game is represented in standard
strategic (normal) form. The set of players is denoted by I = {1, ..., n}. Each player i ∈ I has
an action set denoted by Ai. An action profile a = (ai, a−i) consists of the action of player i and
the actions of the other players, denoted by a−i = (a1, ..., ai−1, ai+1, ..., an) ∈ A−i. In addition,
each player i has a real-valued, stage-game, payoff function gi : A → R, which maps every action
profile a ∈ A into a payoff for i, where A denotes the cartesian product of the action spaces Ai,
written as A ≡ I×
i=1
Ai. In the infinitely-repeated game with perfect monitoring, the stage game in
each time period t = 0, 1, ... is played with the action profile chosen in period t publicly observed
at the end of that period. The history of play at time t is denoted by ht = (a0, ..., at−1) ∈ At,
where ar = (ar1, ..., a
r
n) denotes the actions taken in period r. The set of histories is given by
H =
∞⋃
t=0
At,
3
where we define the initial history to the null set A0 = {∅}. A strategy si ∈ Si for player i is,
then, a function si : H → Ai, where the strategy space of i consists of Ki discrete strategies; that
is, Si = {s1i , s2i , ..., sKii }. Furthermore, denote a strategy combination of the n players except i by
s−i = (s1, ..., si−1, si+1, ..., sn). The set of joint-strategy profiles is denoted by S = S1 × · · · × Sn.
Each player i has a payoff function piti : S → R, which represents the average payoff per period
when the joint-strategy profile is played for t periods.
2.2 Evolution of Learning
Players have attractions, or propensities, associated with each of their strategies, and these at-
tractions determine the probabilities with which strategies are chosen when players experiment.
Initially, all strategies have an equal attraction and hence an equal probability of being chosen.
The learning process evolves through the strategies’ attractions that are periodically updated.
Similar to its predecessors, the self-tuning EWA model consists of two variables that are updated
once an agent switches strategies. The first variable is Ni(χ), which is interpreted as the number
of observation-equivalents of past experience in block χ of player i.3 The second variable, denoted
as Aji (χ), indicates player i’s attraction to strategy j after the χ
th block of periods. The variables
Ni(χ) and A
j
i (χ) begin with some prior values, Ni(0) and A
j
i (0). These prior values can be thought
of as reflecting pre-game experience, either due to learning transferred from different games or due
to pre-play analysis. In addition, we use an indicator function I(x, y) that equals 1 if x = y and
0 otherwise. The evolution of learning over the χth block with χ ≥ 1 is governed by the following
rules:
Ni (χ) = φi(χ) ·Ni (χ− 1) + 1, (1)
and
Aji (χ) =
φi(χ) ·Ni (χ− 1) · Aji (χ− 1) + I(sji , si (χ)) ·Ri (χ) + δji (χ) · E ji (χ)
φi(χ) ·Ni (χ− 1) + 1 , (2)
where Ri(χ) is the reinforcement payoff and E ji (χ) is the expected forgone payoff to player i for
strategy j.
The reinforcement payoff, Ri(χ), is defined as the average payoff obtained by player i over the
3Traditionally, action-learning models require that the updating of a player’s action set occurs at the end of
each period. Instead, the proposed methodology in Ioannou and Romero (2014) requires that the updating of
repeated-game strategies occurs with the completion of a block of periods, where a block typically consists of more
than 1 period. Furthermore, players’ blocks of periods vary in length and end at different time-periods (see also
Subsection 2.3).
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χth block,
Ri (χ) =
1
Ti(χ)
∑
a∈h(χ)
gi (a) ,
where h(χ) is the sequence of action profiles played in the χth block, and Ti(χ) is the χ
th block’s
length for player i. In addition, the forgone payoffs in the self-tuning EWA model with repeated-
game strategies are not as simple as in the case of the self-tuning EWA model with actions,
where the opponent’s action is publicly observed in each period. To calculate the forgone payoff
E ji (χ) players need to form beliefs about the current repeated-game strategy of their opponent. In
particular, the expected forgone payoff for player i of repeated-game strategy j over the χth block
is the payoff player i would have earned had he chosen some other repeated-game strategy j given
his beliefs about player −i’s current repeated-game strategy.
We indicate next how beliefs are specified. To determine the beliefs, let h (t1, t2) = (a
t1 , at1+1, . . . , at2)
for t1 ≤ t2 be the truncated history between periods t1 and t2 (all inclusive). Also, let h (t, t− 1) =
∅ be the empty history. Let Ti(χ) =
∑χ
j=1 Ti(j) be the total number of periods at the end of block
χ. Then, repeated-game strategy s−i is consistent with hTi(χ) for the last t′ periods if
s−i (h (Ti(χ)− t′, Ti(χ)− t′ − 1 + r)) = aTi(χ)−t
′+r
−i for r = 0, . . . , t
′ − 1.
Define the fitness function F : S−i × N→ [0, Ti(χ)] as
F (s−i, χ) = max
{
t′|s−i is consistent with hTi(χ) for the last t′ periods
}
.4 (3)
Define the belief function B : S−i × N→ [0, 1] as
B(s−i, χ) = F(s−i, χ)∑
r∈S−i
F(r, χ)
,
which can be interpreted as player i’s belief that the other player was using repeated-game strategy
s−i at the end of block χ. Therefore, the expected foregone payoff for player i of strategy j over
4In the context of finite automata (a formal description is provided in Appendix A), let hti(χ) be player i’s
action in the tth period of block χ, and s−i =
(
Q−i, q0−i, f−i, τ−i
)
be a potential automaton for player −i. We
say automaton s−i is consistent with h(χ) for the last t′ periods, if according to the history, it is possible that
the other player played automaton s−i in the last t′ periods and, given player i’s most recent action, the proposed
automaton is in the starting state. Formally, automaton s−i is consistent with h(χ) for the last t′ periods if there
exists some state qt ∈ Q−i such that ht−i(χ) = f−i (qt) and qt+1 = τ−i (qt, hti(χ)) for all Ti(χ)− t′ + 1 ≤ t ≤ Ti(χ)
and qTi(χ)+1 = q0.
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the χth block is given by
E ji (χ) =
∑
s−i∈S−i
pi
Ti(χ)
i (s
j
i , s−i|h(s−i,χ)) · B(s−i, χ),
where s−i|h is the continuation strategy induced by history h and
h (s−i, χ) = h (Ti(χ)−F (s−i, χ) , Ti(χ)− 1)
is the longest history such that s−i is consistent with hTi(χ).
In the original EWA model of Camerer and Ho (1999), the attraction function consisted of
the exogenous parameters δ and φ. In the self-tuning EWA model, these exogenous parameters
were changed to self-tuning functions δ(·) and φ(·), referred to as the attention function and the
decay-rate function, respectively. The attention function δ(·) determines the weight placed on
forgone payoffs. The idea is that players are more likely to focus on strategies that would have
given them a higher payoff than the strategy actually played. This property is represented by the
following function:
δji (χ) =
{
1 if E ji (χ) ≥ Ri(χ) and sji 6= si(χ)
0 otherwise.
Thus, the attention function enables player i to reinforce only unchosen strategies with weakly
better payoffs. On the other hand, the decay rate function φ(·) weighs lagged attractions. When
a player senses that the other player is changing behavior, a self-tuning φi(·) decreases so as to
allocate less weight to the distant past. The core of the φi(·) is a “surprise index,” which indicates
the difference between the other player’s most recent strategy and the strategies he chose in the
previous blocks. First, define the averaged belief function σ : S−i × N→ [0, 1],
σ(s−i, χ) =
1
χ
χ∑
j=1
B(s−i, j),
which averages the beliefs, over the χ blocks, that the other player chose strategy s−i. The surprise
index Si(χ) simply sums up the squared deviations between each averaged belief σ(s−i, χ) and the
immediate belief B(s−i, χ); that is,
Si(χ) =
∑
s−i∈S−i
(σ(s−i, χ)− B(s−i, χ))2.
Thus, the surprise index captures the degree of change of the most recent beliefs from the historical
average of beliefs. Note that it varies from zero (when there is belief persistence) to two (when a
6
player is certain that the opponent just switched to a new strategy after playing a specific strategy
from the beginning). The change-detecting decay rate of the χth block is then
φi(χ) = 1− 1
2
Si(χ).
Therefore, when player i’s beliefs are not changing, φi(χ) = 1; that is, the player weighs previous
attractions fully. Alternatively, when player i’s beliefs are changing, then φi(χ) = 0; that is, the
player puts no weight on previous attractions.
Attractions determine probabilities of choosing strategies. We use the logit specification to
calculate the choice probability of strategy j. Thus, the probability of a player i choosing strategy
j when he updates his strategy at the beginning of block χ+ 1 is
Pji (χ+ 1) =
eλ·A
j
i (χ)∑K
k e
λ·Aki (χ)
.
The parameter λ ≥ 0 measures the sensitivity of players to attractions. Thus, if λ = 0, all
strategies are equally likely to be chosen regardless of their attractions. As λ increases, strategies
with higher attractions become disproportionately more likely to be chosen. In the limiting case
where λ→∞, the strategy with the highest attraction is chosen with probability 1.
2.3 Asynchronous Updating of Repeated-Game Strategies
The probability that player i updates his strategy set in period t, 1Pti , is determined endogenously
via the expected length of the block term, P ti , which is updated recursively; that is,5
P ti = P t−1i −
1
P t−1i
∣∣∣ 1t−t(χ(t)) ∑t−1s=t(χ(t)) gi(asi , as−i)− Esi(χ(t))i (χ(t))∣∣∣
g¯ − g ,
where t(χ) is the first period of block χ, and χ(t) is the block corresponding to period t. In
addition, g¯ = maxa1,a2,j gj (a1, a2) is the highest stage-game payoff attainable by either player,
and g = mina1,a2,j gj (a1, a2) is the lowest stage-game payoff attainable to either player. The
normalization by 1
g¯−g ensures that the expected block length is invariant to affine transformations
of the stage-game payoffs. The variable P ti begins with an initial value P0i . This prior value can
be thought of as reflecting pre-game experience, either, due to learning transferred from other
games, or due to (publicly) available information. The law of motion of the expected block length
5For the interested reader, a detailed exposition to asynchronous updating of repeated-game strategies can be
found in Ioannou and Romero (2014).
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depends on the absolute difference between the actual average payoff thus far in the block and the
expected payoff of strategy si. The expected payoff for player i, Esi(χ(t))i (χ(t)), is the average payoff
that player i expects (anticipates) to receive during block χ(t) and is calculated at the beginning
of the block. The difference between actual and expected payoff is thus a proxy for (outcome-
based) surprise. As Erev and Haruvy (2013) indicate, surprise triggers change; that is, inertia
decreases in the presence of a surprising outcome.6 In addition, a qualitative control is imposed
on the impact of surprise on the expected block length. Multiplying the absolute difference by
1
Pt−1i
ensures that when the expected block length is long, surprise has a smaller impact on the
expected block length than when the expected block length is short.
3 Results
We study next the relative frequency, speed of convergence and progression of a set of repeated-
game strategies in four symmetric 2×2 games: Prisoner’s Dilemma, Battle of the Sexes, Stag-Hunt,
and Chicken. The payoff matrices of the games are illustrated in Figure 1. For the computational
simulations, we chose to limit the number of potential strategies considered so as to reflect elements
of bounded rationality and complexity as envisioned by Simon (1947). Thus, the players’ strategies
are implemented by a type of finite automaton called a Moore machine. Figure 2 depicts a player’s
candidate strategy set, which consists of one-state and two-state automata. A formal description
is provided in Appendix A.
In the simulations, players engage in a lengthy process of learning among strategies. At the
beginning of the simulations, each agent is endowed with initial attractions Aji (0) = 1.5 for each
strategy j in Si
7 and initial experience Ni(0) = 1. Players are matched in fixed pairs and update
their attractions at the end of each block. The play ends when the average payoff of a given
pair converges. More specifically, each simulation is broken up into epochs of 100 periods. The
simulation runs until the average epoch payoff of the pair has not changed by more than 0.01 from
the previous epoch (in terms of Euclidean distance) in 20 consecutive epochs.8 The simulations
6This gap-based abstraction can be justified from the observation that the activity of certain dopamine-related
neurons is correlated with the difference between the expected and actual outcomes (see Caplin and Dean (2007)).
7The values of the initial attractions are derived from the Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) model of Camerer, Ho, and
Chong (2004).
8The maximum length in each of the simulation runs was set to 100,000 periods. The average payoff of the pair
converged in 1, 000× 4− 47 = 3, 953 out of the 4,000 total simulations. In 47 simulations, all in the Battle of the
Sexes game, the average payoff of the pair did not converge; players were playing their preferred outcome most of
the time, but there was too much noise for the average payoff of the pair to converge. In all other simulations,
the average payoff of the pair converged. The median length for convergence was 10,750 periods in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, 11,400 periods in the Battle of the Sexes game, 2,750 periods in the Stag-Hunt game, and 3,300
periods in the Chicken game. Given the convergence criterion, the minimum length of periods for a simulation
8
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Figure 1: Payoff Matrices
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Figure 2: One-State and Two-State Automata
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use an intensity parameter λ = 4 in the logit specification.9 The initial value of P0i is set to
100 periods.10 The results displayed in the plots are averages taken over 1,000 simulated pairs.
At the start of the simulations, each of the strategies in a player’s candidate strategy set has an
equal attraction and hence an equal probability of being selected. This phase is a lengthy learning
process that ends when the average payoff of a given pair of automata converges. We elaborate
next on the results of the computational simulations.
3.1 Relative Frequency and Speed of Convergence
The payoff matrix of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is indicated in Figure 1(a). The cooperative
action is denoted with the letter “A,” whereas the action of defection is denoted with the letter
“B.” Each player’s dominant strategy is to play B. Figure 3 displays the results of the simulations
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Figure 3(a) shows the relative frequency of automaton pairs played
over the last 1,000 periods. The relative frequency of an automaton pair is the number of times
the automaton pair occurred normalized by the total number of occurrences of all automaton
pairs. Automaton 6, which implements the “Grim-Trigger” strategy, was the one with the most
occurrences. It is important to note that the cooperative outcome (A,A) is sustained in a pair
consisting of Grim-Trigger automata. This finding is confirmed in Figure 3(b), which plots the
relative frequency of the payoffs. Crucially, even though the majority of automaton pairs converged
run is 20 × 100 = 2, 000 periods. This implies that, for instance in Stag-Hunt, a pair of players who arrives at
convergence in a median length of 2,750 periods has reached the convergence point after 7.5 strategy-updates (a
pair of players arrives at convergence point in 7.5× 100 = 750 periods, given that P0i is set to 100).
9The calibration is based on a grid search. We consider a simple goodness-of-fit measure to determine how far
the predictions of the model are from the experimental data. The dataset used is from Mathevet and Romero
(2012). Subjects were instructed that the continuation probability for an additional period was 0.99; this was
common knowledge in all experiments conducted. We compare the average payoffs over the last 10 periods of the
computational simulations to the average payoffs over the last 10 periods of the experimental data. To calculate
the measure, we first discretize the set of possible payoffs by using the following transformation:
D (pi) = ε
⌊pi
ε
⌉
,
where pi is the payoff, ε is the accuracy of the discretization and D(pi) denotes the transformed payoff. Note that
the symbolic function b·e rounds the fraction to the nearest integer. For example, if ε = 0.5, then the payoff pair
(pi1, pi2) = (2.2, 3.7) would be transformed to (D (pi1) , D (pi2)) = (2, 3.5). We then construct a vector consisting of
the relative frequency of each of the transformed payoffs given some ε. We do the same for the experimental data. To
determine how far the predictions of the model are from the experimental data, we calculate the Euclidean distance
between the model’s vector and the vector of the experimental data. If the predictions match the experimental
data perfectly, then the distance will have a value of 0. The maximum value of distance is
√
2 for each game. This
value is attained if only one payoff is predicted by the model, only one payoff is observed in the experiment, and
the two payoffs are different. Crucially, for a given discretization parameter ε, we define the best goodness of fit
model as the one whose parameter value minimizes the sum of Euclidean distances across the four games studied.
10An upper bound of 60 periods was set on the fitness function for computational efficiency; that is, a player can
use a maximum of 60 periods when formulating beliefs.
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Figure 3: Prisoner’s Dilemma
Notes: Figures 3-6 follow the same structure. Panel (a) shows the relative frequency of play across the 262
automaton pairs over the last 1,000 periods. The relative frequency of an automaton pair is the number of times
the automaton pair occurred normalized by the total number of occurrences of all automaton pairs. The relative
frequency of a given pair is denoted by a square located on the coordinates that correspond to that pair; the darker
(more red) the square, the higher the (relative) frequency of that pair. In addition, the relative frequency (as a
percentage rounded to the nearest integer) is displayed for each pair that appeared at least once in the simulations.
If the relative frequency is < 0.5% it shows as a 0. Panel (b) shows the relative frequency of each payoff combination
over the final 1,000 periods and the set of feasible payoffs. The radius of the circle is r =
√
RF
2 , where RF is the
relative frequency. Note that this is a concave function which emphasizes points with small relative frequency.
Panel (c) provides information on the speed of convergence. The left axis indicates the probability and the red
dotted line denotes the Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function (ECDF) for convergence. On the other hand,
the blue solid line and the green dashed line correspond to the right axis and provide information on the payoffs of
the automaton pairs when averaged over the last 1,000 periods. The blue solid line represents the average payoff
of the automaton pair ( g1+g22 ). The green dashed line represents the absolute payoff difference of the automaton
pair (|g1 − g2|). Points on the blue solid and the green dashed line are sorted according to the corresponding point
on the red dotted line. 12
to the cooperative payoff (3, 3), there, still, exists a small number of automaton pairs, which chose
to defect repeatedly and thus earned a payoff of (2, 2). Finally, the plot in Figure 3(c) provides
information on the speed of convergence. The red dotted line denotes the Empirical Cumulative
Distribution Function (ECDF) for convergence. The blue solid line and the green dashed line
provide information on the payoffs (right axis) of the automaton pairs when averaged over the
last 1,000 periods. The blue solid line represents the average payoff of the automaton pair (g1+g2
2
).
The green dashed line represents the absolute payoff difference of the automaton pair (|g1 − g2|).
Points on the blue solid and the green dashed line are sorted according to the corresponding point
on the red dotted line. About 20% of the simulations converged quite quickly in less than 3,000
periods. At this point in time, the blue solid line signifies that the average payoff of the automaton
pairs was 3. Given the convergence criterion, we can deduce that about 20% of the automaton
pairs started off by cooperating and maintained cooperation until convergence. The next 70% of
the simulations were (roughly) uniformly distributed across the range of 3, 000− 27, 000 periods.
The last 10% of the simulations converged in the range of 27, 000 − 34, 000 periods. Looking
at the green and blue lines, we observe that the pairs that were converging in less than 27,000
periods ended up at the cooperative outcome, while the pairs that converged at 31,000 periods
and beyond converged to the defecting outcome. After 31,000 periods, the automaton pairs that
did not attain cooperation experienced short expected block lengths, which prompted them to
constantly update the strategies in a manner similar to action-learning models hence converged
to the defecting outcome. Pairs that converged between 27,000 and 31,000 periods ended up in
either the cooperating or the defecting outcome.
The payoff matrix of the Battle of the Sexes game is indicated in Figure 1(b). In this game,
there are two pure-strategy equilibria: (A,B) and (B,A) . Figure 4 shows the results of the
simulations. In particular, Figure 4(a) shows the relative frequency of automaton pairs played
over the last 1,000 periods. The plot covers a large number of automata although Automaton 12
and Automaton 18 show up most frequently. Automaton 12 switches actions every period unless
both players choose B in the previous period. Automaton 18 switches actions every period unless
both players choose A in the previous period. Therefore, a pair consisting of Automaton 12 and
Automaton 18 would end up alternating between the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the
stage game. Each automaton would thus earn an average payoff of 3. This is shown in Figure
4(b). Arifovic, McKelvey, and Pevnitskaya (2006) indicate that standard learning algorithms
have limited success in capturing the alternation between the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria
in the Battle of the Sexes game. Yet in the proposed model, automata predominantly converge
on alternating behavior between the two actions. Finally, a few pairs converged to one of the two
pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Figure 4(c) provides information on the speed of convergence. The
automaton pairs can be classified into two groups: (1) those which converged to alternations, and
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(2) those which converged to one of the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. The pairs that converged
to alternations are denoted by the green dashed line at a payoff of 0 (i.e. players within the pairs
earned the same payoff). These pairs converged in less than 28,000 periods. On the other hand,
the pairs which converged to one of the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria are denoted by the green
dashed line at a payoff of 2. The latter pairs took between 28,000 and 34,000 periods to converge.
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Figure 4: Battle of the Sexes
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Figure 5: Stag-Hunt
The payoff matrix of the Stag-Hunt game is indicated in Figure 1(c). In this game, there are two
pure-strategy Nash equilibria: (A,A) and (B,B). However, outcome (A,A) is the Pareto dominant
equilibrium. Figure 5 shows the results of the simulations. The relative frequency of automaton
pairs in Figure 5(a) suggests that a relatively small set of automata was chosen. Automaton 5,
which implements the “Win-Stay, Lose-Shift” strategy, and Automaton 6, which implements the
“Grim-Trigger” strategy were the ones with the most occurrences. Other automata that were
chosen frequently included: Automaton 1, Automaton 3, Automaton 4, and Automaton 26. It
is important to note that with the exception of Automaton 26, any pair combination from this
small set of automata yields a payoff of 3 as both players choose (A,A) repeatedly. Automaton
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26 paired with Automaton 26 corresponds to alternating between the two pure-strategy Nash
equilibria, which yields an average payoff of 2. Figure 5(b) confirms that the most likely outcome
is for both players to choose A repeatedly. Note that there is also a small number of pairs
that converged to (2, 2). Figure 5(c) shows that convergence in the Stag-Hunt game was quite
fast. More specifically, 90% of the pairs converged within only 6,000 periods. The blue solid line
oscillates mostly between an average payoff of 3 and an average payoff of 2, while the green dashed
line indicates that, in either case, the average payoff difference of the automaton pairs was 0.
Automaton 1
A
u
to
m
at
on
2
0
0
1
1
2
0
0
2
26
0
0
0
1
6
5
4
7
4
24
1
5
5
2
3
0
0
0
3
2
4
9
0
0
0
6
22
1
6
3
7
8
0
8
20
0
0
0
10
18
0
12
16
0 0
14
14
0
0
0
16
12
0
0
0
0
0
18
10
0
0
0
0
20
8
0
0
22
6 0
0
0
0
0
24
4
0
0
0
26
2
0
0
0
0
0 1 2 3 4
0
1
2
3
4
Payoff 2
P
ay
off
1
(a) Relative Frequency of Automaton Pairs (b) Relative Frequency of Payoffs
4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32
Periods to Convergence (in thousands)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
0
1
2
3
4
5
P
ay
off
Convergence ECDF (left axis)
Average Payoff (right axis)
Payoff Difference (right axis)
(c) Speed of Convergence
Figure 6: Chicken
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The payoff matrix of the Chicken game is indicated in Figure 1(d). In this game, there are
two pure-strategy Nash equilibria: (A,B) and (B,A). Recall that in the Chicken game, the
mutual conciliation outcome of (A,A) yields higher payoffs than the average payoffs for each
of the players when alternating between the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Figure 6 shows the
results of the simulations. The results in plots (a) and (b) confirm that game-play converged to a
small set of automata: Automaton 3, Automaton 4, which implements the “Tit-For-Tat” strategy,
Automaton 5, which implements the “Win-Stay, Lose-Shift” strategy, and Automaton 6, which
implements the “Grim-Trigger” strategy. In addition, a very small number of pairs converged
to one of the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. The simulations work in a similar manner to
those in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The automaton pairs, which converged quickly to the
conciliation outcome are those that started off by conciliating. Some other automaton pairs that
did not establish conciliation from the beginning managed eventually to attain the conciliation
outcome. Finally, the rest ended up in one of the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. The latter
observation is evident by the blue line, which indicates an average payoff of 2.5 for the pairs that
converged towards the end.
In summary, the extension of the self-tuning EWA model from actions to a simple class of
repeated-game strategies improves predictions in two distinct ways. First, it allows for conver-
gence to non-trivial sequences, such as alternation in the Battle of the Sexes game. Second, the
richer set of strategies allows the emergence of sophisticated strategic behavior, which not only
incorporates punishments and triggers, but also anticipation of punishments and triggers. Such so-
phisticated behavior is instrumental in capturing cooperative behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game and mutual conciliation in the Chicken game, precisely, because the threat of punishment
may drive a selfish player to conform to cooperation and conciliation in the two games. An alter-
native approach could be to assume a mixture of adaptive and sophisticated players. An adaptive
player responds to either the payoffs earned or the history of play, but does not anticipate how
others are learning, whereas a sophisticated player responds to his forecasts using a more sophisti-
cated forward-looking expected payoff function and a mental model of an opponent’s behavior (see
Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2002), Chong, Camerer, and Ho (2006), Hyndman, Terracol, and Vaks-
mann (2009) and Hyndman, Ozbay, Schotter, and Ehrblatt (2012)). Yet such teaching models’
inability to both execute and anticipate sophisticated behaviors, impedes the delivery of coopera-
tion and conciliation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and the Chicken game, respectively. Take,
for instance, learning in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Assume that there exists a population of
agents, which consists of sophisticated players and adaptive players a´ la Camerer, Ho, and Chong
(2002). An adaptive player always chooses to defect, regardless of his belief about the opponent’s
action, because defection is a strictly dominant action. On the other hand, a sophisticated player
is able to anticipate the effect of his own behavior on his opponent’s actions. However, this is
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not sufficient to drive a sophisticated player paired with an adaptive player to cooperative be-
havior because the adaptive player will choose to defect, as defection is always his best response.
Consequently, the sophisticated player will also respond with defection, and, thus, the pair will
lock themselves into an endless string of defections. Analogous arguments hold for the Chicken
game; that is, a teaching model with sophisticated and adaptive players would predict the Nash
equilibrium − not, the mutual conciliation outcome.
3.2 Progression
Figures 7-10 display information about the progression of play relative to the periods until conver-
gence for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Battle of the Sexes, Stag-Hunt and Chicken games, respectively.
Figure 7 displays information about the progression of play for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Fig-
ure 7(a) confirms that Automaton 6, which implements the “Grim-Trigger” strategy, was the one
with the most occurrences. In the same panel, we also observe that in the earlier periods, Au-
tomaton 14 was played almost as frequently as Automaton 6. Automaton 14 plays A one time,
and plays B from then on. Automaton 14 is gradually phased out. Figure 7(b) indicates that
pairs are playing the uncooperative outcome (B,B) around 70% of the time before convergence;
eventually, the pairs learn to play the cooperative outcome (A,A).
Figure 8(a) shows that in the Battle of the Sexes game, the pairs that take a long time to
converge predominately play the preferred action B. Eventually pairs learn to play automata that
alternate between the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Figure 8(b) shows that 5,000 periods
before convergence about half of the time pairs are playing the non-equilibrium outcome (B,B)
and half of the time pairs are playing one of the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Pairs rarely
ever play the (A,A) outcome.11 Eventually pairs either play one of the two pure-strategy Nash
equilibria or alternate between the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Furthermore, by the time
convergence is reached, only a small percentage of pairs are stuck in an inefficient war-of-attrition
outcome.
Figure 9(a) shows that in the Stag-Hunt game, the small percentage of pairs that took more
11There are several reasons why automata favor action B over action A. First, if the co-player is selecting an
action at random (i.e. selects each action with probability 0.5), then one is better off selecting the most preferred
choice; that is, action B. Second, if one is trying to set a precedent on preferred choice, they may continually select
the preferred choice to make the co-player believe that there is no intention to switch to the other action. In such
a case, the co-player may eventually concede and start best-responding to the player’s preferred action. However,
if a pair is unwilling to concede, then, this will lead to a war-of-attrition outcome where the pair repeatedly goes
to their preferred choice. Consider, for example, a pair using Automaton 12, which is the most commonly used
automaton in the Battle of the Sexes simulation. Recall that Automaton 12 switches actions every period unless
both players choose B in the previous period. Thus, a pair using Automaton 12 will mostly alternate between the
two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, also play a few times the war-of-attrition profile, but will almost never play the
(A,A) outcome.
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Figure 7: Prisoner’s Dilemma
Notes: Figures 7-10 follow the same structure. The plots display information about the progression of play relative
to the periods until convergence. The far right of all plots (labeled as “0” on the x-axis) is the point of convergence.
Panel (a) shows the progression of the relative frequency of play across the 26 automata over the last 30,000 periods.
The automata are ordered starting from Automaton 1 and moving up to Automaton 26. The height of a region
at a certain x-value denotes the relative frequency with which an automaton was played at a given number of
periods before convergence. We display in color only those automata with a relative frequency of at least 10% in
the 30,000 periods before convergence; the remaining automata are represented by the white regions. Panel (b)
shows the progression of play of each of the four action profiles. Panel (c) displays the percentage of pairs that
took longer than the given x-value to converge. For example, we observe in (c) that roughly 25% of the pairs took
more than 20,000 periods to converge (and 75% of the pairs took less than 20,000 periods to converge). Thus, the
corresponding x-values in (a) and (b) only reflect 25% of the pairs. All plots are smoothed by taking the average
over the previous 2,000 periods of play.
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Figure 8: Battle of the Sexes
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Figure 9: Stag Hunt
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than 5,000 periods to converge predominately play automata which alternate between the two
pure-strategy Nash equilibria. This is confirmed in plot (b) as the frequency of the two Nash
equilibria is roughly the same. However, this is only a small percentage of the data since about
80% of the pairs converged quickly in less than 5,000 periods. Those pairs that converge quickly
appear to pick one of the cooperative automata (1, 3, 4, 5, 6) from the beginning, which leads to
the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium.
Figure 10(a) shows that in the Chicken game, the pairs that took a long time to converge
overwhelmingly select Automaton 17. This automaton starts off by playing the preferred action
B. It continues to do so as long as the co-player plays A; otherwise, it switches to A. A pair
of such automata are quite infrequent, whereas the relative frequency of the other three action
profiles is about the same. This is what is observed in Figure 10(b). However, analogous to the
Stag-Hunt game, the majority of pairs converge to the cooperative outcome in less than 5,000
periods and quickly learn to play one of the cooperative automata.
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Figure 10: Chicken
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4 Conclusion
Recently, Rabin (2013) proposed a research program that called for the portable extension of
existing models with modifications that would improve the models’ psychological realism and
economic relevance. In Ioannou and Romero (2014), we applied this program of research by
building on three leading action-learning models to facilitate their operability with repeated-game
strategies. The three modified models approximated subjects’ behavior substantially better than
their respective models with action learning. The best performer in that study was the self-
tuning EWA model with repeated-game strategies, which captured significantly well the prevalent
outcomes in the experimental data. In this study, we use the model as a computer testbed to study
more closely the relative frequency, speed of convergence and progression of a set of repeated-game
strategies in four symmetric 2×2 games: Prisoner’s Dilemma, Battle of the Sexes, Stag-Hunt, and
Chicken. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the strategy with the most occurrences was the “Grim-
Trigger.” In the Battle of the Sexes game, a cooperative pair that alternates between the two pure-
strategy Nash equilibria emerged as the one with the most occurrences. Furthermore, cooperative
strategies, such as the “Grim-Trigger” strategy and the “Win-Stay, Lose-Shift” strategy, had the
most occurrences in the computational simulations of the Stag-Hunt and Chicken games. Finally,
we find that the pairs which converged quickly ended up at the cooperative outcomes. On the
other hand, the pairs that were extremely slow to reach convergence ended up at non-cooperative
outcomes.
Recently, Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2013) required subjects to directly design a repeated-game
strategy to be deployed in lieu of themselves in the infinitely-repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette find that subjects choose common cooperative repeated-game strategies, such
as the “Tit-For-Tat” strategy and the “Grim-Trigger” strategy. The “Grim-Trigger” strategy is
also predicted in the simulations of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We hope that in the near future
similar studies will be carried across other symmetric 2 × 2 games to confirm the ability of the
self-tuning EWA model with repeated-game strategies to capture well subjects’ behavior in the
laboratory. Finally, it would be interesting to determine the influence of small errors on repeated-
game strategies. Currently, the only stochasticity of the model enters through the logit decision
rule in the early periods before repeated-game strategies accumulate high attractions, which result
in near deterministic strategy choice. We know from the received literature (Miller (1996), Imhof,
Fudenberg, and Nowak (2007), Fudenberg, Rand, and Dreber (2012), Ioannou (2013) and Ioannou
(2014)) that the likelihood and type of errors can affect the degree of cooperation and the prevailing
strategies. Thus, a fruitful direction for future research would be to test the susceptibility of the
results to small amounts of perception and/or implementation errors.
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A Finite Automata
A finite automaton is a mathematical model of a system with discrete inputs and outputs. The system
can be in any one of a finite number of internal configurations or “states.” The state of the system
summarizes the information concerning past inputs that is needed to determine the behavior of the
system on subsequent inputs. The specific type of finite automaton used here is a Moore machine. A
Moore machine for player i, Mi, in a repeated game G = (I,{Ai}i∈I , {gi}i∈I) is a four-tuple (Qi, q0i , fi,
τi) where Qi is a finite set of internal states of which q
0
i is specified to be the initial state, fi : Qi → Ai
is an output function that assigns an action to every state, and τi : Qi × A−i → Qi is the transition
function that assigns a state to every two-tuple of state and other player’s action. It is pertinent to
note that the transition function depends only on the present state and the other player’s action. This
formalization fits the natural description of a strategy as i’s plan of action in all possible circumstances
that are consistent with i’s plans. In contrast, the notion of a game-theoretic strategy for i requires the
specification of an action for every possible history, including those that are inconsistent with i’s plan of
action. It is important to highlight that to formulate the game-theoretic notion of a strategy, one would
only have to construct the transition function so that τi : Qi ×A → Qi, instead of τi : Qi ×A−i → Qi.
In the first period, the state is q0i , and the automaton chooses the action fi(q
0
i ). If a−i is the action
chosen by the other player in the first period, then the state of i’s automaton changes to τi(q
0
i , a−i), and
in the second period, i chooses the action dictated by fi in that state. Then, the state changes again
according to the transition function given the other agent’s action. Thus, whenever the automaton is
in some state q, it chooses the action fi(q), while the transition function τi specifies the automaton’s
transition from q (to a state) in response to the action taken by the other player. For example, the
automaton (Qi, q
0
i , fi, τi) in Figure 11 carries out the “Grim-Trigger” strategy. In the transition diagram,
a vertex denotes the internal state of the automaton with the prescribed agent’s action indicated in the
center, and the arcs labeled with the action of the other player indicate the transition to the states.
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Qi = {q1, q2}
q0i = q1
fi (q) =
{
A if q = q1
B if q = q2
τi (q, a−i) =
{
q1 if (q, a−i) = (q1, A)
q2 otherwise
Figure 11: Grim-Trigger Automaton
Notes: The vertices denote the states of the automaton, and the arcs labeled with the action of the other agent
indicate the transition to the states.
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